Recent Decisions by Pierce, Jacque W. et al.
PLEADING-NECEssrrY FOR TIMELINESS OF PLEADINGs-REMOVAL
CLAUSE IN REGARD TO FEDERAL JURISDICTION
On February 5, 1954, plaintiff, a citizen of New York, commenced
a personal injury action in a New York state court against defendant, a
citizen of New Jersey. The complaint was served on November 20 and,
by stipulation, the time of defendant to move or answer was extended
to January 20, 1955. On January 19 defendant filed a petition and bond
for removal to the U. S. District Court for the southern district of New
York. On February 9, after removal to federal court, plaintiff filed a
motion to remand to the state court for lack of jurisdiction on the sole
ground that defendant was not truly a citizen of New Jersey. The motion
was denied and on May 5 plaintiff's request for a jury trial was refused
because of failure to make the request within ten days after having received
notice of defendant's petition for removal to federal court. On June 29
plaintiff then filed a motion to remand to the state court on the ground
that defendant had failed to file his petition for removal within twenty
days after receipt of a copy of the initial pleading, as required by 28
U. S. C. §1446 (b) (1952). Held: Motion to remand denied. The re-
quirement of the removal statute as to time was mandatory, but not juris-
dictional. The stipulation of the parties extending defendant's time to
answer or move to the complaint did not permit an extension of the period
of time in which the petition for removal could be filed. However, even
though the case may have been improvidently removed in the sense that
the petition for removal was not filed within the time prescribed by statute,
that was not a jurisdictional defect. The plaintiff's original motion to
remand made no mention of the defendant's untimely filing; affirmative
action in the federal court on the part of the plaintiff in filing a request
for a jury trial has estopped him to assert any right to remand to the state
court. Green v. Zuck, 133 F. Supp. 436 (S.D. N. Y. 1955).
Prior to 1948 the removal provision required that the petition be
filed "at any time before the defendant is required by the laws of the
state or the rule of the state court in which such suit is brought to answer
or plead." 36 STAT. 1095, 28 U. S. C. §72 (1911). The revision of the
Judicial Code in 1948 made various changes in the removal procedure.
Section 1446 (b) of Title 28 provided that the petition was to be filed
"within twenty days after the commencement of the action or service of
process whichever was later." 62 STAT. 939 (1948). This statute was
amended in 1949 so that, at the present time, the petition must be filed
"within twenty days after the receipt by the defendant of a copy of the
initial pleading, or within twenty days after the service of summons if
the initial pleading is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever
period is shorter." 63 STAT. 101 (1949).
Before the revision of 1948 there was a conflict as to whether a
stipulation between the parties or a court order extending the defendant's
time to answer or otherwise plead, was effective to extend the time for
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removal to federal court. A majority of the courts held it did not. See
cases cited in 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, §101.12, p. 3525, footnote
26 (1938). For cases holding to the contrary see Anthony, Inc. v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp, 346 (S.D. N. Y. 1934) and cases
cited therein. The minority courts held that the defendant was not re-
quired to answer or plead within the meaning of the statute until expira-
tion of the court order. Hansford v. Ordean Wells Co., 201 Fed. 185
(Mont. 1912). After the revision of 1948 the U. S. District Court for
the southern district of New York repudiated its former view that a stipu-
lation or court order would automatically grant extension. Dutton v.
Moody, 104 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. N. Y. 1952). That case held that
Congress intended to achieve nationwide uniformity as to the period in
which a petition for removal could be filed; thus, the rationale of the
former rule was destroyed because the statute was no longer framed in
terms of time to answer, but prescribed a specific time period.
It seems reasonably clear that this interpretation of Congressional
intent is the correct and logical one. However, there is some disagreement
as to whether the Congressional purpose was wise. See IKeeffe, Venue and
Removal Jokers in New Judicial Code, 38 VA. L. REV. 569 (1952).
This article points out that the rigidity of the rule may work some in-
justices, particularly in the case of non-resident motorists. In such a situ-
ation process is usually served on a state official acting as implied designee.
Although notice is then mailed to the defendant's last known address,
service of process is considered complete when the implied designee is served
and the twenty day period begins to run. The result is that the defendant
has little time to appraise his position and decide whether or not to request
removal to federal court. However, some courts, such as the U. S. District
Court for the southern district of Ohio, have taken the view that service
is not complete and the twenty day period does not begin to run until the
defendant has received actual notice. Moon v. Makowski, 114 F. Supp.
914 (S. D. Ohio 1953). For other cases in accord and to the contrary
see Mahony v. Witt Ice and Gas Co., 131 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Mo.
1955) and cases cited therein.
The principal case has much support for its proposition that "manda-
tory" is not synonymous with "jurisdictional." Professor Moore says:
"Under the prior practice the time limitation on removal was said not
to be jurisdictional, but merely modal and formal; and this rule is equally
applicable under the new code." MOORE'S COMMENTARY ON THE U. S.
JUDICIAL CODE, §0.03 (42), p. 273 (1949). For case authority prior
to 1948 see 4yers v. Watson, 113 U. S. 594 (1894) and Powers v.
Chesapeake and 0. R. Co., 169 U. S. 92 (1898). Recent cases which
hold that the time limitation is modal, not jurisdictional, and subject to
waiver are: Kramer v. Jarvis, 81 F. Supp. 360 (Neb. 1948); Hamilton
v. Hayes Freight Lines, 102 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Ky. 1952); Fisher v.
Exico Co., 13 F. R. D. 195 (E.D. N. Y. 1952). If there is diversity of
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citizenship and the amount in controversy is more than $3000, the re-
quirements of federal jurisdiction are met. For this reason 28 U. S. C.
§1447 (c) (1952), which provides that if the case has been improvidently
removed and without jurisdiction the federal court shall remand to the
state court, has no application.
There is justification for the point of view taken by these courts. In
all fairness to both parties there ought to be a point at which the plaintiff
can no longer attack the procedure by which removal to the federal court
was made. The litigants can then devote their energies and efforts to the
merits of the case. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (h), which provides only one
opportunity to make certain objections as to matters of procedure.
Jacque W. Pierce
AGENCY-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF SON WHOSE APPLICATION
FOR AN OPERATOR'S LICENSE SIGNED BY FATHER BARS Surr BY FATHER
AGAINST THIRD PERSON UNDER OHIO REV. CODE §4507.07
This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages to his automobile
which was being driven by his minor son when the accident occurred. The
plaintiff had signed his minor son's application for an operator's license.
The accident was caused by the combined negligence of both the son and
the defendant. From an adverse judgment in the trial court, the plaintiff
is appealing to the Court of Appeals. Held, under OHIO REV. CODE
§4507.07 which imputes negligence of a minor motorist to the person
signing the minor's application for an operator's license, the contributory
negligence of the son is imputed to the plaintiff so as to bar his suit. Mc-
Cants v. Chenault, 98 Ohio App. 529, 130 N.E. 2nd 382 (1954).
At common law there are two requirements for an imputation of
negligence from a tortfeasor to an innocent person: the tortfeasor must
be a representative of such person acting within the scope of his employ-
ment and must be subject to a right of control by such person at the time
of the tort. Babbitt v. Say, 120 Ohio St. 177, 165 N.E. 721 (1929);
Higbee Co. v. Jackson, 101 Ohio St. 75, 128 N.E. 61, 14 A.L.R. 131
(1920). This general rule is also applicable to an imputation of contribu-
tory negligence. Cincinnati Street Railway Co. v. Wright, Adm'r., 54
Ohio St. 181, 43 N.E. 688 (1896).
The courts in the majority of the jurisdictions take the view that a
family relationship such as husband and wife or parent and child stand-
ing alone is not enough for the imputation of negligence. The courts reason
that such a relationship does not meet the tests of a person acting within a
scope of employment and subject to a right of control. Davis v. Guarnieri,
45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350 (1887); Neal v. Rendall, 98 Me. 69, 56
At1. 209 (1903).
With the advent of the automobile and the ever-increasing risk of
damage to persons and property arising out of its operation, some states,
either through decisional or statutory law, have departed from these gener-
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al requirements for the imputation of negligence and have formulated cer-
tain specific rules with regard to the operation of motor vehicles.
The "family purpose" doctrine is found in about half of the Ameri-
can jurisdictions. The courts following this doctrine hold that the owner
of an automobile who permits members of his family to drive it for their
own convenience is liable for the negligence of such person on the ground
that the owner has made such a family purpose his "business". This theory
is based on the fiction that the owner has his automobile for the purpose
of providing pleasure for his family, and that whenever any member
of his family is driving it, he is furthering the owner's interest and is there-
fore his agent. King v. Smyth, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296 (1918);
Dibble v. Wolff, 135 Conn. 428, 65 A. 2d 479 (1949); Lattin, Vicari-
ous Liability and the Family Automobile, 26 MIcH. L. REV. 846 (1928);
PBossER, ToRTs, p. 369 (2d ed. 1955).
Other jurisdictions have rejected the "family purpose" doctrine and
have held that in order for liability to attach to the owner of an automobile
because of the negligence of the driver, the driver must actually be an
agent or a servant of the owner acting within his scope 9nd subject to an
immediate right of control by the owner. Trice v. Bridgewater, 125 Tex.
75, 81 S.W. 2d 63, 100 A.L.R. 1014 (1935); Anderson v. Byrnes, 344
Ill. 240, 176 N.E. 374 (1931); Bretzfelder v. Demaree, 102 Ohio St.
105, 130 N.E. 505 (1921).
There are several types of statutes which attempt to solve this prob-
lem. In some states it is provided that a lessor of motor vehicles is responsi-
ble for damage done through the negligent driving of a lessee. CONN.
GEN. STAT. §2479 (1949); ME. REV. STAT. c.22 §157 (1954). Some
states have passed statutes providing that an owner of a motor vehicle is
liable for damage caused by a minor below a certain age operating the
vehicle with the owner's consent. ME. REV. STAT. c.22 §156 (1954);
DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 21 §6106 (1953); IDAHO CODE §49-1003
(1949). In other jurisdictions there is legislation making the automobile
owner liable for injuries to third persons caused by the negligence of any
person, whether a member of the family or not, who is operating the auto-
mobile on the public highway with his consent. N. Y. VEHICLE AND
TRAFFIC LAW §59; IOWA CODE §321.493 (1950). Other states have
statutes like that involved in the principal case providing that the person
who signs a minor's application for a driver's license is liable for the
negligence of the minor. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 §§2710, 6105 (1953);
OHIO REV. CODE §4507.07 (1953).
Jurisdictions having a statute of the type which makes the owner
liable for any injuries to third persons caused by the negligence of any
person operating the automobile with his consent differ as to whether the
contributory negligence of the driver is imputed to the owner so as to bar
his suit against a negligent third person. The Iowa Supreme Court has
held that such a statute is broad enough to cover all the legal relations of
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principal and agent and that since the negligence of an agent is imputed
to a principal under circumstances stated above, an owner's suit is barred
by the negligence of the driver. Secured Finance Co. v. Chicago Rock
Island & Pac. Ry., 207 Iowa 1105, 224 N.W. 88, 61 A.L.R. (1929).
Delaware, Minnesota, and New York, however, follow the view that
such a statute applies only for the purpose of holding the owner liable to
the person injured and does not make the driver's contributory negligence
imputable to the owner in an action against a third person. These states
have held that the purpose of such a statute is only to provide for the
establishment of financial responsibility of the owners of motor vehicles
and not to create a general principal-agent relationship. Westergreen v.
King, 99 At. 2d 356 (Del. 1953); Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201,
36 N.W. 2d 711, 11 A.LR. 2d 1429 (1949); Mills v. Gabriel, 259
App. Div. 60, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 78, affirmed, 284 N. Y. 751, 31 N.E. 2d.
512 (1940).
The principal case seems to be the only reported decision considering
whether under the Ohio type of statute, i.e., one imputing negligence of
a minor to the person signing the application for the minor's driver's
license, the contributory negligence of the minor is imputed to the signer
so as to bar a suit by the signer. The Court states at page 530:
We believe the Legislature intended joint and several
liability in all its implications not only in money damages to
an injured third party, but that, having placed a potentially
dangerous instrumentality in the hands of a minor, the person
responsible therefor should stand in exactly the same position
as the minor and be clothed with the imputation of negligence
for all purposes.
It is submitted that the Court in this case took out of context the
paragraph of the statute imputing the negligence of the minor to the signer.
This is indicated by the court's failure to read it in conjunction with a
following provision of the same statute which states that on proof of
financial responsibility of the minor such person signing the application
is not subject to the liability. The combination of these two provisions
seems to indicate that the legislative intent in passing the statute was
to provide more certain compensation in money damages for a third
person injured by a minor motorist and not to bar an action by the signer
under the circumstances of the principal case.
T. Bryan Underwood, Jr.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-INTERVENING AGENCY CAPABLE OF
ELIMINATING EXISTING HAZARD
Action by plaintiff to recover damages for injuries received when a
forging crashed through his car windshield after falling from a passing
truck. Ford Motor Co. operated a forge plant in Canton, Ohio, and there
packed and loaded forgings to be shipped to Detroit, Michigian on a
tractor-trailer unit of Rogers Transportation Co. En route, the driver
[Vol. 17
RECENT DECISIONS
observed forgings falling from the truck and stopped to repair the broken
box which he found on the trailer. To accomplish the repair he knocked
boards off two other pallet boxes, one containing forgings similar to the
one which struck the plaintiff, and nailed them onto the broken box.
After continuing for some distance, the driver stopped to check his load
and found forgings, resembling the one found in plaintiff's car, lying
loose on the bed of the trailer. The court assumed, on the theory pre-
sented, that Ford was negligent, and Held: Rogers was a responsible
intervening agency, "which, after becoming conscious of the hazard,
could and should have eliminated it, and by not doing so broke the chain
of causation between Ford's negligence and the injury." Hurt v. Rogers
Transportation Co.; Ford Motor Co., Appellant, 164 Ohio St. 323, 130
N. E. 2d 824 (1955).
The court of common pleas, which granted a motion for judgment
non obstante verdicto, was affirmed. The case in the lower courts dealt
chiefly with problems of proof. Specifically, the problem was whether
the forging slipped through the negligently constructed box, or bounced
out as a result of the driver's removing the upper most slap. Under the
view of the case taken by the court, after the situation had been discovered
the origin of the forging was of no consequence. The appellate court held
that reasonable minds could find the forging had slipped through the
slats, thus posing a jury question which the trial court improperly took
from the jury's province. This does not appear from the opinion to have
been considered by the Supreme Court. Forgings had slipped between
the slats on previous occasions, a fact of which Ford was aware. The
court disposed of the contention that Ford could be held to foresee the
natural and probable results of its negligence with the statement that
"having accepted' the load, Rogers' transportation thereof and its own
attempt to remedy the defect relieved Ford of any responsibility it may
originally have had." The attempt to correct the discovered defects thus
was held to insulate Ford from liability for subsequent injuries to the
plaintiff, irrespective of the possible, even probable, foreseeability thereof.
The court placed the principal case within the rule of the Thrash
case: "Moreover, in the circumstances of this action the U-Drive-It
Company may invoke the rule that, where there intervenes between an
agency creating a hazard and an injury resulting from such hazard
another conscious and responsible agency which could or should have
eliminated the hazard, the original agency is relieved from liability. A
break in the chain of causation thereby takes place which operates to ab-
solve the original agency." Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465,
110 N.E. 2d 419 (1953). Circumstances of the principal case were
held to be such that Ford could invoke the above rule. Justification on
this basis can be refuted by a glance behind the rule, disclosing serious
weaknesses in it.
"The defendant ordinarily will not be relieved of liability by an
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intervening cause which could reasonably have been foreseen, nor by
one which is a normal incident of the risk created." PROSSER, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 266 (2d ed., 1955). "The fact that an inter-
vening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent
manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another which
the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized
that a third person might so act, or (b) a reasonable man knowing the
situation existing when the act of the third person was done would not
regard it highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or (c)
the intervening act is a normal response to a situation created by the actor's
conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negli-
gent." 2 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF TORTS 447 at 1196. (Emphasis
added.) Upon reflection, the Thrash rule is found to be inadequate be-
cause of the omission of any consideration of natural and foreseeable
consequences, a necessary segment of any supervening negligence rule.
There are hundreds of cases which involve the question in point;
it would be mere surplusage to belabor them all. A leading Ohio case
is Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Snyder, 55 Ohio St. 342, 45 N.E. 559
(1896). The defendant had delivered a box car to plaintiff's employer
to be shipped to Detroit. Defendant was negligent in not repairing the
ladder upon which employees were to stand, but Snyder's employer was
also negligent in failing to inspect before putting the car into operation.
The court held defendant liable because the negligence of the immediate
employer was not an efficient intervening cause, for the defendant could
apprehend the result as the natural and probable consequence of his negli-
gence. The similarity between the Snyder case and the principal case
is striking, though they are not precisely the same. In Gedeon v. East
Ohio Gas Co.. 128 Ohio St. 335, 190 N.E. 924 (1934), the de-
fendant's driver stopped his car at the curb, opened the car door on the
driver's side, and jumped out into the stream of traffic without looking.
As he jumped in front of an approaching automobile, the driver of the
automobile swerved his car to avoid the the defendant's driver and went
completely across the road and onto the sidewalk where he struck the
plaintiff. In holding that the plaintiff could recover against the Gas Com-
pany, the court stated that a "tort feasor can be held legally responsible
only for the probable consequences of his act . . . By probable, how-
ever, is not meant 'more likely than not,' but rather 'not unlikely' or
such a chance of harm as would induce a prudent man not to run the
risk, such a chance of harmful result that a prudent man would fore-
see an appreciable risk that some harm would happen." Thus, in the
principal case Ford was bound to foresee some risk of harm after it had
been warned that forgings had been falling from its boxes and when it
knew or should have known that upon falling from the truck those forg-
ings could injure an innocent person. The defendant's driver in Pugh
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v. Akron-Chicago Transportation Co., 64 Ohio App. 479 (1940), had
blocked the road with his truck during efforts to repair it. While the
plaintiff's car was waiting behind the truck, another car struck him from
the rear forcing plaintiff into the truck. The court held that as a matter
of common knowledge the defendant's truck driver could have reason-
ably anticipated such collision as a not entirely improbable result of ob-
structing the highway. Neff Lumber Co. v. Bank, 122 Ohio St. 302,
171 N.E. 327 (1930); Mudr;ck v. Standard Oil Co., et al., 87 Ohio
App. 8, 86 N.E. 2d 324 (1949), and Callahan v. N.Y.C. Ry Co., 22
Ohio Op. 164, 37 N.E. 2d 620 (1942) are a few of the many other
cases in Ohio dealing with the problem of proximate cause.
The general rule seems clearly to include a consideration of fore-
seeability and natural and probable consequences. The reasonable infer-
ence to be drawn from the court's remarks in the principal case that
". .. Rogers was a responsible intervening agent which, after becoming
conscious of the hazard, could and should have eliminated it, and by not
doing so broke the chain of causation . . ." is that Ford would have been
absolved of liability regardless of the origin of the forging because the
driver discovered the hazard. -A jury could reasonably have found the
driver's actions were not highly extraordinary under the circumstances, and
that Ford could have reasonably foreseen that a truck driver would
attempt to repair, with whatever tools he may carry with him, the negli-
gently constructed box. It would not be unreasonable to present such a
question of proximate cause to the jury, assuming as we do that it is a
problem upon which reasonable minds could differ.
A more sensitive appreciation of the developments in negligence law
and a wiser application of its principles would have led to a contrary
decision in the principal case. Clarification of the principles of negligence
law is a much desired end for which modern courts should strive.
David .9. Katz
CRIMINAL LAW - REFUSAL OF DEFENDANT TO SUBMIT TO
INTOXICATION TEST IN PROSECUTION FOR DRUNKEN DRIVING
Defendant was arrested by a member of the Columbus Police De-
partment and taken to police headquarters where he was charged with
violation of a city ordinance against operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated. While at the headquarters, defendant was asked to submit to
a urinalysis and blood test to be given by the police chemist to determine
the extent of defendant's intoxication. Defendant refused the request
unless his physician were present or would give the test. No response was
made to this conditional answer and no test was made. At the trial the
police chemist was called as a witness by the prosecution and testified at
length as to his experience in administering such tests, the scientific prin-
ciples involved and the infallibility of the tests to determine the- extent
of intoxication. Counsel for the defendant objected to the admission of
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this testimony, but was overruled. Held: the refusal of the defendant
to submit to a urinalysis test unless his physician were present was reason-
able and does not lay the foundation for any inference of an admission
of guilt. Under such circumstances, it was prejudicial error for the trial
court to admit the testimony of the police chemist as to the infallibility
of the intoxication test. City of Columbus v. Mullins, 162 Ohio St.
419, 123 N.E. 2d 422 (1954).
In recent years the question of the use of scientific tests to determine
the extent of intoxication and the admissibility in evidence of the results
has been litigated by the courts in many states. Heretofore, the issues
raised have fallen into one of several categories. When a party volun-
tarily submits to such a test the courts have consistently held the results
thereof admissible in evidence. City of Columbus v. Thompson, 55
Ohio L. Abs. 302, 89 N.E. 2d 604 (1949); State v. Morhid, 286 N.W.
413 (Iowa 1939); State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937).
But see, Halloway v. State, 146 Texas Crim. 353, 175 S.W. 2d 258
(1943). The most controversial group of cases involves the admissibility
of the fact of a party's refusal to submit to the test. In this area the
courts have differed in their application of the privilege against self-
incrimination in criminal actions when the prosecution attempts to com-
ment on the party's refusal. State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W.
275 (1941); Apodacav. State, 140 Texas Crim. 593, 146 S.W. 2d 381
(1940); State v. Gratton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E. 2d 265 (1938).
See also, OHIO CoNsT., ART. I § 10; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2265
(3rd Ed. 1940). The question of admissibility of evidence received
from an unreasonable search and seizure has been raised in a third class of
cases where the specimen was taken from defendant at a time when he
was not able to consent to or resist the action. Block v. People, 125 Colo.
36, 240 P. 2d 512 (1952), cert. denied 343 U.S. 978 (1952); State
v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940). See also Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The instant case raises a new ques-
tion, that is, the existence of a middle ground position between a voluntary
submission and an absolute refusal to submit to an intoxication test. It
appears from a review of the cases that the Ohio court in the instant
case was the first to raise and pass on the legal merit of a reasonable
refusal to undergo such a test.
In the absence of any case law in point, it is necessary to look to
other areas of the law to endeavor to determine by comparison and
analogy the proper legal position on the point. Rule 35 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part: "In an action in
which the mental or physicial condition of a party is in controversy, the
court . . . may order him to submit to a physical . . . examination by a
physician . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 4323. A few states have enacted similar
legislation, while in others it has been held that the courts have an inherent
power to order an examination when it becomes necessary to serve the
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ends of justice. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Trester, 123 Ohio St. 383, 175 N.E.
611 (1931); Wittenberg v. Onsgard, 78 Minn. 342, 81 N.W. 14
(1900). The courts have insisted, however, that such examination be con-
ducted by an impartial, competent physician. Where it was shown by the
party ordered to submit to the examination that the examination would be
injurious to his health, the court deemed the condition unreasonable and
refused to grant the order. Disder v. John Shilito Co., 26 Ohio L. Abs.
430, 11 Ohio Opp. 181 (1941). So too, when the party showed that
the examination would be excessively painful and dangerous, the court
refused to compel such action. Carrig v. Oakes, 18 N.Y.S. 2d 917, 259
App. Div. 138 (1940). In several cases where the party was ordered
to undergo a physical examination, the patient has requested that his physi-
cian be present at that time and the courts have allowed this request,
holding it to be a reasonable one. Pollard v. Page, 56 Ga. App. 503,
193 S.E. 117 (1937); Willams v. Chattanooga Iron Works, 131 Tenn.
638, 176 S.W. 1031 (1915). These cases are distinguishable on the
facts from the instant case, but the manifest principle is analagous.
Although the reasonable request in the principal case was to have
the party's own physician during the administration of the test, there is
another area in which the problem may well arise, that is, the right to
consult counsel generally over the telephone, but in person if his presence
can be had immediately before submitting or refusing to submit to the test.
The right of an accused party to counsel is deemed fundamental to our
system of justice, U. S. CONsT., Amend. VI, but in the application of this
principle to the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, the right
has not been extended as far as seems desirable. Thus, some states have
enacted legislation extending the scope of this right. In Ohio it appears
that a party charged with a crime has a right to confer privately with his
legal adviser at all reasonable times. Snook v. State, 34 Ohio App. 60,
170 N.E. 444 (1929). It is provided in OHIo REv. CODE § 2935.17
that "A court or magistrate must allow an accused a reasonable time to
send for counsel, and for that purpose may postpone the examination."
Correlatively, OHIO REv. CODE, § 2935.16 states that "After arrest of
a person . . . any attorney at law ... may, at the request of the prisoner
. . .immediately visit the person arrested and consult him privately . . ."
The right to consult counsel immediately is particularly important in these
cases because of the liberal interpretation most courts have given to acts
allegedly constituting a voluntary submission to an intoxication test, and
further, because of the different treatment by the courts of the accused's
refusal to submit. Therefore, it appears that a request by the party to
consult counsel before he is required to consent or refuse to submit
to an intoxication test should and would be deemed a reasonable one.
In any attempt to determine the bounds of reasonable requests as a
condition precedent to submission to a scientific intoxication test, we must
consider the scientific aspects of the problem. It is obvious that the com-
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pliance with a reasonable request necessary involves a delay in time before
the party produces the specimen for analysis, and the lapse of time between
the arrest and taking the specimen will have a direct relation to the
alcoholic content found in the body. Alcohol begins to oxidize in appre-
ciable quantities soon after absorption, often within five or ten minutes.
39 J. CRIM L. & C. 225 (1945). This oxidation takes place only in
the blood stream and thus the alcohol content in the urine will not be dis-
turbed. However, when the alcohol content or build-up in the urine
is greater than that in the blood stream, the alcohol will pass out of the
bladder and become diffused into the blood stream where it will be oxi-
dized. There is no way to determine at any given time the relative content
of alcohol in the blood or in the urine, save by taking a sample of each.
It is known that although the build-up in the blood is more rapid, by
the time a peak of alcoholic saturation is reached by a person, the alcohol
content in the urine will exceed the content in the blood by a five to four
ratio. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the rate of
oxidation varies with the individual on the basis of size, activities, degree
of saturation and other lesser factors. Several states have taken cognizance
of these facts and require that the specimen be taken within two hours
after arrest to be admissible in evidence. N. Y. VEHICLE & Txumc
LAW, ART. 5, § 70 (5); Wis. STAT. § 85.14 (4). It is generally agreed
that such provisions materially increase the accuracy of the test.
The established practice of police chemists and others administering
the test is to take a specimen from the accused as soon as he is brought in
and to determine the percent of alcohol by weight in the system as of
that time. Any lapse of time while a reasonable request is being granted
would necessarily mean greater oxidation of the alcohol in the system
and the test therefore would not reflect the party's true state of intoxica-
tion. It is recognized that juries place great reliance on the scale for meas-
uring the extent of intoxication in terms of the percentage of alcoholic con-
tent in the body set forth by the National Safety Council's Committee
on Tests for Intoxication, and some states have written this scale into their
traffic laws. N. Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW, supra; Wis. STAT., supra.
This scale states that an alcoholic content of under .05 % by weight is
prima facie evidence that the party is not intoxicated, .06 to .14%o is
substantial evidence but raises no inference, and .15 % or higher is prima
facie evidence that the party is intoxicated.
One possible solution compromising the right to reasonable requests
and the consequent time lapse with the necessity for determining the
alcoholic content at a time as near the arrest as possible, would be to
allow the police -chemist to take two specimens, one hour apart, after
the request has been granted. The difference in the content would repre-
sent the minimum hourly rate of oxidation in the person. With this
figure it would be possible to calculate back from the time of the first test
to determine the alcoholic content in the accused at any time after he had
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ceased consumption. Since the rate of oxidation is highest at the time
of peak saturation and diminishes with lesser content, the rate as de-
termined by the two tests, when used to calculate a prior state of intoxi-
cattion could work only for the benefit of the party. This practice is used
in some cases now, but a widespread application would depend on its
reconsiliation with the provisions of the New York and Wisconsin laws
for taking the test within two hours after arrest.
The Supreme Court in the principal case has opened up a novel
point of law. Although the implications are quite broad, the court disposed
of the matter in a one sentence paragraph, prefaced with the phrase "in
our opinion" and without any treatment of the relevant legal or scientific
problems. The situations are perhaps limited in which a person accused
of being under the influence of alcohol might make a reasonable request
as a prior condition to submission to a scientific intoxication test. Never-
theless, there is an apparent need for a consideration of the various factors
involved and the setting forth of some guiding tests and principles, lest
the reasonable request becomes a dodge of the accused to delay and thus
lessen his chances of conviction.
Marc Gertner*
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